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AFCIN RECONNAISSANCE PLAN IN SUPPORT OF THE
BERLIN/EAST GERMANY SITUATION

USAF Declass/Release Instructions On File

1. Assuming that political negotiations over the Berlin/East

Germany situation are unsuccessful or commence to deteriorate rapidly and the threat of overt military action becomes imminent, the requirement will exist for immediate photographic reconnaissance of the Soviet orbit.

2. It is impossible to forecast precisely on a time and scope

basis, the manner in which a deteriorating situation would develop.

Therefore, the photographic reconnaissance plan must be flexible

enough so as to be responsive to one or more of the following

Essential Elements of Information designed to cover any situation.

a. Actions taken by the USSR to prepare for the risk or

conduct of a war with the U. S. over the Berlin situation.

b. USSR actions to turn access control over to the GDR

and GDR actions to interfere with western access to Berlin.

c. Actions taken by the satellites to participate directly

or indirectly in a war over the Berlin issue.

3. Reconnaissance objectives in support of each of these EEL

have been nominated and are attached as TABS "A", "B", and "C".

Each specific objective is listed in order of priority. Large scale

overflight of the Soviet orbit during a tense situation could result

*J.R.K.
Jan 1, 1959*

*Received from AF - J.R.K. and
to J.G.S. is keeping with AFRC
J.G.S. had sent to Berlin planning*

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in a miscalculation leading to a war. Therefore, it is likely that a minimum number of sorties will be authorized at any given time. Sortie planning should therefore take into consideration the priority listing of the targets in each category.

4. The determination of which category of targets should be covered at a particular time will depend in large measure on the prevailing circumstances and intelligence available from other sources. For example, if during the breakdown of political negotiations, Khrushchev were to indicate his willingness to accept the risk of a war with the U. S., the reconnaissance objectives in TAB A would become highest priority.

5. With the initiation of the SAC War Plan, this reconnaissance plan would be superseded by the SAC directed recon plan in support of their Emergency War Operations and coordinated with theater and CIA reconnaissance operations.

6. The above contingencies are based on the deterioration of all negotiations in which resulting armed conflict could be expected. However, there exists now a need to obtain reliable information which would assist in the planning for negotiations.

7. Photographic evidence to improve the validity of intelligence estimates of the Soviet capability to employ nuclear missiles against the U. S. could be a decisive tool for our Government and military planners in the progress of negotiations for the future of Berlin and

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East Germany. Complete knowledge of the Soviet ICBM operational missile capability and the degree to which this capability could be employed, either politically or militarily, could well assist the direction of U. S. foreign policy as pertains to Soviet demands and ultimatums. If a substantial ICBM operational capability does exist, it would be meaningful in terms of Soviet willingness to risk war with the U. S. over Berlin.

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3. It is therefore recommended that action again be initiated immediately to obtain overflight authority for coverage of suspected Soviet ICBM sites. The areas nominated for coverage are primarily those which have already been approved for missile search by the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee. These objectives are included in TAB "D".

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TABS "A" thru "D" -
a/s above

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